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Germán W. Rama* 
The cycle of structural transformation and the 
intensive policies of modernization and social 
participation through education brought about a 
number of changes in social structures which worked 
to the benefit of the young generations. 
The opportunities for upward social mobility 
were not the same for the different socio-
occupational categories. However, despite these 
differences of opportunity, the children of lower-
income families were able to find employment to a 
certain degree in higher posts. 
The power structures tried to limit the effects of 
this social irruption by establishing different levels 
of quality in education or allocating higher-level jobs 
unequally, according to social origin. 
The crisis accentuates the tendency for the 
processes of upward mobility to slow down and go 
into reverse. The young groups without education 
are displaced from the jobs market; those of low 
social origin who have acquired education are pushed 
in the direction of social exclusion; income and 
especially university attendance depend to a large 
extent on elevated social origin and are the best 
protection against the crisis; and lastly, instead of 
upward occupational mobility, jobs are beginning to 
be passed on from one generation to another. In 
some countries it is even becoming difficult for the 
children of manual workers to take over their 
parents' jobs, despite their better education; those 
who remain in the category are proportionately 
fewer than those who move into marginal 
occupations. 
The author concludes that the crisis has 
accentuated the polarization of societies, for as the 
consequences of the exhaustion of the cycle of 
structural change grow worse, a situation arises in 
which the social relations are being established 
among comparatively solidified groups. The 
problem of youth as a whole is transformed, even 
more clearly than before, into the problems of young 
people in different and stratified social groups. 
"Director of ECLACs Social Development Division. 
Introduction 
Today's Latin American youth has features 
which distinguish it from the youth of other 
regions and indeed from the Latin American 
youth of the past. It is standing at the confluence 
of two big historical processes: one is the cycle of 
structural transformation of Latin American 
societies, which began to change in the postwar 
period at different speeds and with different 
intensity; the other is the economic crisis of the 
1980s, which has underlined the shortcomings 
of existing models of development. Youth has a 
crucial role in both processes. Because of its 
enormous weight in the region's age structure it 
was the first group to be incorporated in the 
modern forms of social organization; then, when 
the recession slowed or d is rupted 
modernization, youth became an age group 
particularly affected by exclusion. 
There has also been a great change in its own 
role. During the stage of structural 
transformation, of societies in flux, it had an 
important role among the political protagonists. 
Human settlements, cultural patterns and the 
forms of production and social organization 
underwent various changes which also created 
different or unequal opportunities of 
incorporation in society as well as in some of the 
social and political processes which sought to 
build some model of an alternative society. It is 
no coincidence that the period has been 
characterized by very great political instability 
and violent discords and that in all cases there 
has been considerable political participation by 
youth sectors. 
In the majority of the Latin American 
societies the crisis arrives at a moment when 
change has already created a new social structure 
and future changes are not based on processes of 
incorporation but on processes of inter-
relationship among the social groups and on 
productive change within the logic of a modern 
industrial economy. For the majority of the 
societies "forward retreat", as a mechanism of 
incorporation and postponement of conflicts, 
has run out of steam, and they have reached 
stages of organization, rationalization and 
agreement among different interests and groups 
which do not facilitate action by young people as 
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such: the inter-relationship is among groups in 
which youth participates through older people. 
This process —in which stability and 
democratic recovery are paradigmatic— 
coincides with the economic crisis in a period 
fraught with risks. In the case of youth this 
means a double exclusion: on the one hand, it 
cannot take its place in society by finding 
employment and setting up a family; on the 
other hand, its participation is deferred, for the 
adjustment policies imply a great concentration 
of decision-making and policy implementation 
and they exclude for the moment the use of social 
mobility as a driving force in the search for new 
forms of social and political organization. 
The picture has other complications 
associated with the effects of the external 
In Latin America change has come about 
through the expansion of social structures and 
not —with except ions— through a 
revolutionary process which altered the relative 
positions of the groups within a pre-existing 
social structure. Unlike European societies, 
which changed from a basis of culturally very 
integrated peasant and craft structures, in Latin 
America the whole of society was set in motion 
from a basis of fragmented situations towards 
new undefined social structures, with respect 
both to planning and to possible concrete action, 
owing to the very instability of a growth process 
in peripheral economies and to the lack of 
coherence between political and social goals. 
The move was not from the traditional to 
the modern but rather —in politics, education 
and economics— from the local or subordinate-
group subculture to the culture of the mass 
communication media, and from family or 
parochial institutions to all-embracing national 
ones. In this kind of change the dynamic 
prevailed over the static; social mobility over 
debt —a considerable legacy from the older 
generation to the younger— and with the 
reduction of the margins of independence of the 
Latin American States, subjected as they are to 
conditions imposed by their creditors with 
which the States must comply in their respective 
national societies. 
There is no doubt, in view of the 
inequalities of development and the varied 
nature of the problems, that the situation differs 
in some areas where the national constitution is 
still embryonic, as is certainly the case in Central 
America. The reduction of independence then 
takes the form of foreing intervention, or else 
the central problem remains the continuation of 
an authoritarian model of social and political 
imposition. 
social reproduction; the role of the State as 
director of the process over thé role of social 
classes as proponents of plans; and the processes 
of incorporation through socxo-cultural 
modernization over the processes of 
incorporation through production, which 
defines relations among groups in terms of work 
and the dispute as to what direction 
development should take and how distribution 
should be defined (Touraine, 1976). 
The process is building new institutions, 
new social groups with new interrelationships, 
and it is consolidating them, thus setting limits 
on possible changes: the interests of the internal 
groups and the interrelationship with the 
international economic system mean that not all 
that is possible is probable, except at a very high 
social and cultural cost. Only those changes 
which arise from what already exists are 
probable. 
The cycle of social fluidity led to a 
consolidation which echoed earlier oligarchical 
social structures or to consolidation of a social 
I 
Change, crystallization and recession in social 
structures 
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order typical of the bourgeois European 
economy of the first half of the century, or lastly 
to some kind of social organization capable of 
progressive change which included the 
differentiation of social protagonists and a 
system of balance and conflict, either between 
groups occupying different positions in the 
production process or between groups defined 
more by culture and opinion than by their work 
or income status. 
In either case, the groups and classes 
became consolidated. The capitalist business 
class was created as a result of action taken by the 
State, which provided the framework and 
instruments for its development. Once 
established, it became a social agent 
participating in alliances in some cases and 
confronting the State in others, while in yet 
other instances it tended to control the State. 
The proletariat had in the past been swollen by a 
continual and massive influx of recent entrants 
into industrial activity, which made it difficult 
for the proletariat to shape an identity as the 
basis for its social action; it then became, in its 
most modern part, a category linked to advanced 
technological production, with increasingly 
standardized and improved levels of education. 
Its growth became irregular and even began to 
decline, both as a percentage of the EAP and in 
absolute numbers in some countries (Delich, 
1986; Lagos and Tokman, 1983). It was 
reconstituted to a large extent by the children of 
the proletariat itself, and this developed into a 
tradition of belonging to the working-class 
group. The situation was not entirely different 
among professionals and technicians. The rapid 
expansion of university rolls in the 1960s and 
1970s went hand in hand with the increase in 
jobs which provided professionals with 
relatively high incomes; in the next decade the 
advance was slower. The rolls and jobs or 
incomes marked time or retreated. In the 
societies which began to modernize earlier, 
university students usually come from 
professional families which themselves have 
university education, or from strata culturally 
allied to the university class (Klubitschko, 1980). 
As the cycle of expansion by means of the 
structural transformation of societies came to an 
end, this kind of mobility ran out of steam in the 
already modernized countries (ECLAC, 1986). 
The number of posts in the middle and upper-
middle ranges only increased, in the best of cases, 
in step with the population increase or the 
increase of the product. For example, once basic 
schooling had been provided for an already 
urbanized population, the increase in the 
category of teachers could not be higher than the 
increase in the school-age population. The 
demand for new workers was increasingly 
conditioned by technological change, which 
meant a relative reduction in the mere 
performance of tasks, together with an 
expansion in jobs requiring better educational or 
technical qualifications. 
The cycle of structural change took place in 
the majority of cases within a framework of 
tension between processes which created and 
reproduced social inequality (ECLAC, 1985c) and 
others which aimed at social democratization. 
The contradictory effects of this situation 
became more evident in the crisis of the 1980s. 
A marked concentration of income 
persisted (Altimir, 1979; Di Filippo, 1984). In 
some cases it increased; in others it permitted a 
degree of access for some strata in the middle 
and lower-middle income range. As it became 
integrated in a productive industrial structure, 
this concentration acquired greater rigidity. Less 
than the whole of society was served by 
mechanisms of tertiary income distribution 
through universal social policies of standardized 
application (for example, pre-school ana1 school 
services with food programmes^and equalization 
of standards, national health insurance, or 
payments to meet the cost of the biological and 
social survival of families, waged or not). This 
type of benefits was enjoyed only by certain 
categories which obtained them by means of the 
corporative mechanisms which characterized 
social development (Mesa Lago, 1985). The 
process of concentration took different forms, 
depending on whether it was a question of rural 
or urban zones, or backward regions or growth 
poles (Cordero and Tello, 1984), so that there 
were different population groups whose inter-
relationships with the development process 
were compartmentalized and whose avenues of 
mobility resembled parallel circuits; they not 
only had different points of departure and 
arrival but frequently no possibility of transfer 
from a lower to a higher level. 
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As the idea of a society in flux gained 
ground, so the notion of limits on expectations 
of individual or group mobility was disappearing 
from the collective consciousness of the lower 
social groups (Rama, 1964). This was followed 
by a genuine revolution in expectations. The 
power systems could control the distribution of 
incomes but could not set limits on the nation's 
aspirations for integration or on social 
modernization; as a result, some institutional 
systems —such as politics or education— 
underwent a substantial expansion of 
participation. (The countries which until more 
recent date denied the electoral franchise to 
illiterates or excluded the lower sectors from 
political expression through lack of inclination 
or authoritarianism were also the countries with 
the weakest education policies.) Furthermore, 
the increases in secondary and higher education 
were much greater than those recorded in 
developed countries at a similar stage; however, 
primary schooling had not yet been made truly 
universal, a fact which shows the degree of 
exclusion implicit in the social policies (Rama, 
1983). 
The imbalance between the processes of 
concentration and those of distribution worked 
to the detriment of the latter: for example, 
education was extended to lower social groups, 
but its standards were lowered (Tedesco, 1984). 
In addition, the periodic reversions to 
authoritarianism caused many disruptions of the 
democratic political mechanisms which 
threatened the concentration of power and 
income. These contradictions in the evolution of 
national societies in the 1960s and 1970s can be 
seen clearly in the indicators of structural change 
on the one hand, and on the other in the 
reappearance of authoritarian régimes, be they 
conservative or populist. There are 
comparatively few examples of democratic 
institutional continuity in full-participation 
societies. 
The structural changes, which included the 
incorporation of youth in the period 1950 to 
1980, can be seen from the following indicators 
(Rama, 1984): 
a) Population: the population doubled in 
numbers and its density increased, with 
extensive settlement in the towns (the 
proportion of urban dwellers increased from 40 
to 63 % )• The towns grew at a rate of about 5 % a 
year. This provided an opportunity for greater 
social interaction involving young people, whose 
share in the total population increased, 
especially in the towns. 
b) Education: the period's most marked 
changes were found in education. The illiteracy 
affecting almost half the population aged 15 and 
over declined and became residual among the 
young generations (except in Brazil and some 
countries of Central America). Entry into 
primary school began to become universal, but 
only a little over half of the age group completed 
their primary education. Secondary education, 
formerly reserved for élites, massive explosion, 
as can be seen from the jump in the growth rate 
of attendance: in 1950 there were two graduates 
for every 100 young people aged 20 to 24; in 
1980 it was one for every six young people1 
(Ibarrola, 1986; Tovar and Negretti, 1986). 
c) Employment: the economically active 
population doubled (index 218). Primary-sector 
employment fell by 33.7% (losing 20 percentage 
points); in the secondary sector employment 
rose from 17 to 24.5%, and in the tertiary sector 
from 29-3 to 41.8% of the total active 
population. Not only did the employed 
population cease to be predominantly rural, but 
there was a regular increase in the proportion of 
non-manual workers in urban activities. The 
information for the 1980s (available for only a 
few countries) shows a minimum ratio of 63 and 
a maximum of 109 non-manual workers to every 
100 manual workers. This situation is even 
clearer in the case of wage-earners. The ratio of 
non-manual workers in the secondary and 
tertiary sectors to manual wage-earners in the 
secondary sector or, to put it another way, of 
white-collar to blue-collar workers, varies, 
according to country, between 1:1 and 1.6:1. To 
sum up, Latin American societies not only ceased 
to be rural, they also ceased to be manual 
working-class. 
d) Formalization of employment: the 
percentage increase in modern jobs in industry 
'In Mexico there were 29 895 graduates from higher 
education in 1950 and this figure reached 1 218 667 in 1984, 
increasing by a factor of 40 over that period. In Venezuela the 
number of graduates increased from 24 907 in 1961 to 307 133 in 
1981, increasing by a factor of 12 in little more than 20 years. 
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and services boosted the proportion of waged 
activities. Own-account activities and unpaid 
family helpers declined as a percentage of total 
EAP; there was a percentage reduction (and in 
some countries an absolute one) in the active 
rural population, where own-account 
employment predominated, and the growth in 
the informal urban sector did not compensate 
for this decline. The category of wage-earners 
has become the biggest in the region's EAP, 
except in the countries where agriculture still 
dominates and modernization is in its early 
stages. The increase in the number of waged jobs 
implies in turn better educational qualifications 
and an increasing correlation between these 
qualifications and levels of job status. 
e) Income growth and distribution: the per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) doubled in 
the period 1950-1980, despite the substantial 
rate of population growth. The differences 
between groups of countries are very large. The 
agrarian countries in the early stages of 
modernization (Bolivia, Haiti and Central 
America except Costa Rica) had a growth index 
below 150. The countries of early and advanced 
modernization in the Southern Hemisphere had 
an index in the order of 150; it must be 
remembered that they started from the highest 
levels in the region. The indices osculated 
between 150 and 250 in the countries of rapid 
and unbalanced or partial modernization, which 
include (in ascending order) Peru, Paraguay, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador and 
Mexico. The same index of 250 is found in Costa 
Rica and Panama, whose societies modernized 
themselves in a very short space of time; the 
situation was similar in Venezuela, but with a 
lower index of per capita GDP increase (185). 
Brazil stands out among all the other countries, 
for its per capita GDP in the period 1950-1980 
increased in step with an index of 350. 
The type of income distribution structure 
was more homogeneous than the increases, 
maintaining a hifeh degree of concentration in 
the top 10% and a state of impoverishment at 
least in the bottom 20%. The ECLAC studies 
(1985c) tend to indicate a reduction ¡n the 
percentage of the population below the poverty 
line, although this reduction is smaller than 
might have been expected if the increase in 
incomes had been proportional. The situation in 
the middle ranges is more complicated. In some 
countries —especially those of early modern-
ization and some of rapid modernization— the 
strata immediately above the bottom 20% 
showed improvements in their share of income, 
thus establishing a mesocratic type of income 
distribution (Graciarena, 1979), owing to the 
increase in jobs in the modern sectors, the 
consequent social power of the workers in those 
sectors and the policies of expanding the market 
for industrial consumer durables and semi-
durables. In many countries the middle strata in 
the scale, although showing no great change in 
their share in monetary terms, benefitted from 
the tertiary distribution of incomes resulting 
from the development of free or semi-free social 
services provided by the State (Tironi, 1982). 
Lastly, in the 1970s the countries which pursued 
policies of short-term neoliberal adjustment 
experienced sizeable declines in real wages and 
employment, which affected working and 
middle-class sectors. 
It can be asserted as a general trend that the 
real increase in average, low and very low 
incomes did not depend on a change in the 
structure of income distribution, but 
fundamentally on the rate of increase in per 
capita GDP and also on the redistribution 
through tertiary incomes which had been 
brought about by the social policies of the State. 
f) Processes of incorporation; in the urban 
employment markets there is a simultaneous 
integration of young people, rural migrants and 
women, a phenomenon which has no precedent 
in today's developed countries (Durston, 1986). 
This process explains the explosive growth of 
the urban labour force, which —as Victor 
Tokman (1984) has indeed pointed out— was 
similar to the growth recorded in the United 
States in the period 1870-1903, in Sweden at the 
beginning of the century or in Japan between the 
two wars. However, in this case the EAP had a 
growing proportion of women and a very young 
average age and, most important, there was an 
enormous discrepancy between the education 
levels of the young and adult populations 
(Boucher, 1982; Vogel, 1979). 
These factors helped to bring about the 
lower cost of labour and the exploitation to 
which workers were subjected, In the specific 
case of young people, they had access to non-
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manual and manual jobs of average status and 
requiring educational qualifications, but the 
increase was made up largely of women in lower-
level non-manual jobs (ECLAC, 1986). 
At the beginning of the present decade the 
cycle of social change through structural 
transformation was showing signs of 
exhaustion. In the Southern Hemisphere 
countries of early modernization and in the 
countries of rapid modernization accompanied 
by social integration (Costa Rica, Panama and 
Venezuela) the population engaged in rural 
activities already represented a very small 
percentage; although migration to the towns 
continued, its input could no longer be 
significant in the formation of the lower urban 
stratas and the relative upward displacement of 
the next higher strata. In countries of rapid and 
unbalanced modernization —such as Brazil— 
the rural population had already stabilized in 
absolute terms between 1970 and 1980. Lastly, in 
countries of rapid modernization where urbani-
zation prevailed over industrialization —for 
example, Peru— the marked informality of all 
productive activities denied the migrants the 
possibility of social participation at levels higher 
than those of the countryside. 
In the urban employment structure of some 
countries —for example, Argentina and 
Uruguay— a comparison of censuses in the last 
decade tends to indicate "crystallization" of the 
employment structure: the distribution of jobs 
tends to be roughly the same 10 years later and 
the only change is in the higher average level of 
education of the strata (Arriagada, 1984; ECLAC, 
1985a; SUvestri, 1986). Similar observations on 
the slow rate of incorporation of young people in 
middle- and high-status jobs are put forward as 
an example of frustrated modernization in 
Colombia (Parra, 1985). In countries such as 
Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela which 
underwent a virtual "social mutation" (Durston 
and Rosenbluth, 1984; Durston, 1985; Tovar 
and Negretti, 1986) it would seem difficult to 
maintain the intense growth of jobs in the 
modern services sector, especially in community 
and social services provided by the State. Lastly, 
Mexico and especially Brazil (Katzman, 1983) 
remained paradigmatic exceptions, with rapid 
growth of modern jobs in industry and in the 
modern services which support production. 
Because of the growth rates of their economies, 
and especially of the industrial product, and in 
view of their sizeable rural and urban 
populations with minimum education during 
the initial stages of their development, these 
countries experienced a continuous process of 
incorporation in productive activities 
accompanied by a sharp polarization of the 
incomes of persons employed in low-status and 
high-status jobs. In Brazil this incorporation 
even exceeded the educational expansion, and 
this led to a reduction in the average level of 
education in many employment categories 
(Madeira, 1985). In Chile the double effect of the 
ending of change through structural 
modification and of the application of a 
neoliberal model with extreme economic 
openness encouraged a peculiar socio-
occupational structure in which there was a 
decline in industrial manual-workers jobs and in 
middle-range technical and administrative State 
posts, and the incomes of the civil categories of 
public employees fell. At the same time, there 
was an increase, unusual in the region, of 
independent non-manual jobs (Martinez and 
Tironi, 1983). 
Lastly, in the countries of agrarian structure 
and incipient modernization there was rapid 
urbanization and development of the modern 
apparatus of the State, without corresponding 
industrial development and with serious 
structural problems in agriculture. The 
countryside suffered the effects of capitalist 
forms of production for export, with a very 
concentrated ownership structure and a mass of 
peasants (indigenous in some countries); this 
fuelled a process of peasant impoverishment 
without the alternative of migration to urban 
jobs and it created explosive social conditions in 
the countryside (Torres Rivas, 1981; 
Rosenbluth, 1986). 
The cycle of structural transformation, to 
the extent that it encouraged mobility 
throughout society and therefore some degree of 
satisfaction for each group, generated intra-
generational and even inter-generational change 
with powerful elements of national integration 
and also of social conformity. In the countries of 
early modernization, in which the groups were 
already incorporated in societies incapable of 
generating a new stage of development, the 
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dispute over distribution and the development 
model occupied the political scene (Filgueira, 
1983). 
The crisis of the 1980s occurred at a time 
when the cycle of structural transformation was 
coming to an end. The mechanisms of 
incorporation in modernization (urbanization 
and education, for example) had been used to 
excess; however, no changes had been produced 
in the structure of production, ownership, 
technology and knowledge which would have 
made it possible for the region to be 
incorporated in the cycle of changes in science 
and technology and in the organization of 
societies and cultures which was taking place in 
the developed countries (CEPII, 1984; CEC, 1983). 
The crisis, caused by a cycle in which the 
over-abundance of capital flows "doped" the 
system with consumerism, struck societies 
which, save the exceptions mentioned above, 
had already exhausted the easy mechanisms of 
incorporation, and whose young people were 
being trained in accordance with a model of 
social-structure expansion which had ceased to 
be relevant. Furthermore, the expectations of 
these young people for incorporation in society 
corresponded to that model. 
II 
The forms of incorporation of youth 
The decades between I960 and 1980 saw 
changes in the conditions of incorporation of 
young people in society. On the one hand, their 
distribution among types of jobs changed, and 
gaps were created which could not be filled by 
the adult generations. In some cases these 
generations were unwilling to move from the 
countryside to the town or to change to new jobs. 
In other cases, although the willingness to 
change may have been there, they lacked the 
necessary educational qualifications and cultural 
baggage. Up to 1970, according to census figures, 
49-8% of the rural EAP in 16 countries had not 
completed one year of schooling, and barely 
2.3% had seven or more years. In these same 
countries the percentages of EAP in the national 
capitals were 8.1 and 39.6. Consequently, in the 
hypothetical case of a massive and total 
migration of the rural EAP, the majority of the 
people involved would be unemployable, given 
the education requirements of urban jobs (Terra, 
1981). 
On the other hand, the young people did 
have the education needed for the new jobs and, 
what is more, their education and their access to 
the mass communication media had conditioned 
them to participate in the social and symbolic 
relationships entailed by their jobs and the 
associated social situations. The traditional 
education system of Latin America had been 
modelled on the system existing years earlier in 
the developed countries and it had been 
conceived for students of the upper-middle 
socio-cultural level (Tedesco, 1984). When it 
was extended to the whole population and 
embraced groups from different subcultures, it 
proved incapable, from the teaching standpoint, 
of transmitting knowledge; but it was very 
effective in the provision of prior social 
conditioning for symbolic integration in the 
modern world. The rural families understood it 
in this way: they had no interest in the school as 
long as their childrens' destiny was to remain in 
the countryside: but, when the situation changed 
and they were able to communicate with the 
urban world and came to see migration as a 
possible future for their children, they changed 
their attitude, especially with respect to their 
daughters, who migrated to the towns in greater 
numbers. 
The special relationship of young people 
with the world of work in a time of change 
produced several different effects, which are 
analysed ¡n the following sections. 
24 CEPAL REVIEW No. 29 / August 1986 
1. The de-ruralization of youth 
Table 1 presents data from countries considered 
representative of various categories of 
modernization. Argentina represents early and 
rapid modernization: by I960 only 12.3% of its 
youth worked in agriculture, and only a very 
small percentage could transfer to urban jobs. 
Chile, in the same category, still had a 
considerable proportion of rural population: one 
in four young people worked in agriculture in 
I960, but in 1980 the figure was only one in 10. 
Panama represents modernization through 
adoption of a services economy: the number of 
rural workers in the total of young people in the 
EAP declined from four to two in 10. The next 
category is made up of countries with rapid and 
unbalanced modernization and is represented by 
Brazil. In I960 almost half (44.4%) of Brazil's 
young people worked in agriculture; in 1980 this 
proportion had declined to two in 10. Ecuador 
represents the situation which has been called 
rapid and partial modernization; as in the 
previous case, not only did it have groups 
excluded from modernization, but its dynamism 
was also heavily concentrated in tertiary 
activities and in particular in the State, without 
equivalent changes in the secondary sector. This 
is clearly the most remarkable case with respect 
to the reduction of the proportion of rural 
workers in the young EAP: in 20 years 30% of the 
young people transferred to the urban world. 
Lastly, the data for Honduras represent a 
category of incipient modernization, starting 
from an even greater rural preponderance than 
in the two previous countries; although this 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA (SIX COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN THE EMPLOYMENT 
OF YOUNG PEOPLE 
(Percentages) 
EAP with 7 and more 
years schooling 
EAP with 6 or less 
years schooling 
Jobs in non-manual 
urban and primary 
sectors 
Urban manual jobs 





























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of census data. 
"For Chile, Panama and Ecuador the age-range considered is 25-29; for Argentina, Brazil and Honduras it is 25-34. This 
difference is due to the way the information is organized and does not affect the comparability of the figures. 
*Data from the National Household Survey of October-December 1980 (National Statistical Institute). 
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proportion declined, it still stood at 44,8% of 
young people in rural jobs in 1974 (the same 
percentage as Brazil in I960). This percentage 
has probably been maintained, despite the 
expulsion of people from the rural world, for 
lack of urban centres and activities capable of 
absorbing a larger flow of migrants. 
2. The world of urban manual workers 
This heading includes industrial workers, 
manual own-account workers —including street 
vendors— and service workers both on a 
personal and on an institutional basis. 
The urban social world, which in the 
nineteenth century in France was seen as a world 
of "the working classes, the dangerous classes" 
(Chevalier, 1978), leading to Friedrich Engels' 
analysis of "The Condition of the Working Class 
in England" and to the historical constructions 
of E.J. Hobsbawm (1968), was perceived in Latin 
America in a way which linked urbanization 
with "the inevitable exclusion of increasing 
sectors of the urban population", for what was 
defined as dependent industrialization made it 
"impossible for the increasing migratory flows 
and the new working-class generations, born in 
the towns themselves, to find a stable and 
consistent place in the structure of roles and 
occupations in the new urban society which 
emerges with industrialization" (Quijano, 
1970). 
The processes of incorporation of young 
people in manual and non-manual jobs show 
that, far from fulfilling the prediction of 
increasing exclusion, the period from I960 to 
1980 saw an unexpected development of non-
manual jobs —among vendors, professionals, 
arid administrative and technical staff, all of 
which expanded very rapidly; and the manual 
EAP in secondary and tertiary activities including 
marginal activities, did not come to dominate the 
urban world. Moreover, with the exception of 
Brazil, in 1980 all the countries considered had 
virtually the same numbers of manual and non-
manual jobs in the towns. 
Another aspect of this phenomenon is that 
the world of urban manual workers did not 
manage at any point to incorporate as much as 
half of the young generation in question. The 
highest numbers of manual workers were found 
in the early-industrialization countries, where 
the production pattern was based on small 
enterprises and labour-intensive technology. Up 
to I960 Chile was in this situation, with 48.9% 
of its young people in this category. This figure 
indicates the weight of a proletariat, or urban 
working class, which certainly influenced 
political behaviour in this country in the 
following decades. In another early-
industrialization country, Argentina, 42.7% of 
the young people were in this category and this 
figure reached 44.3% in 1980, possibly the 
highest level in the country's history. The big 
difference between these two countries is that in 
Chile in I960 there were twice as many young 
manual as young non-manual workers; in 
Argentina the gap was much smaller. In both 
countries in 1980 the numbers of young manual 
and non-manual workers had reached parity.2 
Other more recent industrialization 
processes show technological patterns with low 
labour input. Development itself is at a very low 
level in Ecuador, Honduras and Panama. The 
case of Brazil is instructive in several ways. 
Despite the great increase in total GDP and 
industrial GDP in the period 1960-1980, the 
urban manual EAP (including services) increased 
by only eight percentage points. 
In both Brazil and Panama there was a 
decline of more than 20 percentage points in 
employment in primary activities in the period 
between the censuses and the category of manual 
urban workers increased by barely eight points. 
In Ecuador the gap was even greater, with a drop 
of 30 points in primary jobs and an increase of 
only four points in urban manual jobs; these 
figures would still be extremely significant even 
if it is assumed that the bulk of the weighty 
category of "others" in 1982 was accounted for 
by omissions in the registration of urban manual 
workers. 
To sum up, the process of incorporation of 
young people illustrates the trends in the work 
market, both past and future. It is clear that there 
was not a steady increase in exclusion and in 
informal work, and that the towns of Latin 
'The 1980 figures for Chile are distorted by the high 
percentage in the "others" category, which includes a large amount 
of unemployment. 
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America did not become "workers' worlds". It is 
also clear that they will be even less so in the 
future, whatever the industrial growth rate. 
3. The world of non-manual urban workers 
This heading includes white-collar workers, 
managers, dependent and independent 
professional and technical staff, office workers, 
sales people and own-account workers in trade 
(excluding street traders). All the persons 
included in this group have the common feature 
of being non-manual workers, even though the 
differences within the group are significant in 
terms of status and remuneration. The higher 
proportion of women in the subcategories of 
office workers and sales people, and to a lesser 
extent among professional and technical staff, 
depresses the average remuneration in these 
subcategories (ECLAC, 1986). 
However, as in industrial societies (Lipset 
and Bendix, 1963), non-manual jobs in Latin 
America have enjoyed greater prestige than 
manual jobs, probably as a result of the recent 
urbanization and the prestige attached to office 
work in the status hierarchy of the oligarchical 
societies of the recent past. These jobs require a 
higher level of education, which is considered to 
be a very valuable asset in the region, as the 
social demand for it testifies (Filgueira, 1978). In 
general, their level of monetary remuneration 
seems to have increased (note must be taken of 
the region's characteristic association of higher 
income from work and higher levels of 
education; these occupations certainly provided 
greater job stability and social security than in 
the case of manual workers, especially rural 
manual workers (Mesa Lago, 1986). Lastly, the 
few available surveys indicate a strong tendency 
for the holders of these jobs to identify 
themselves as members of the middle classes, 
even though objectively they did not always meet 
the requirements of that status (Solari, 1964). 
Up to I960 the proportion of young people 
who obtained non-manual jobs was between 
one-eighth and one-sixth in Honduras, Ecuador 
and Brazil, and a little under one-quarter in Chile 
and Panama; only in Argentina was the 
proportion higher than one-third. Up to 1980 
the countries tended towards uniformity, with a 
proportion of approximately one-third non-
manual workers (with the exception of 
Honduras, which had less than a quarter, and 
Argentina, which attained the remarkable figure 
of 44.6%). 
This enormous expansion was influenced 
by both economic and social factors. The 
economic factors include the role of modern 
services —financial, administrative and 
technical— as an indispensable support for 
production in a capitalist system. The second 
factors include the development of social and 
community services, requiring a large 
contingent of professional and technical staff, 
the expansion of which has been linked to the 
national efforts to promote integration and the 
establishment of social rights of citizenship 
(Ecuador is a prime example of this). 
An expansion of this magnitude in such a 
short space of time poses the question of 
whether this development amounts to upward 
mobility. Those who say "no" observe that the 
bulk of the growth is found in the subcategories 
of lower status and income and that even among 
professional and technical staff there is a strong 
increase in the numbers of women, which is 
connected with the category's low status and 
income (in the case of teachers, for example). 
Those who say "yes" point to the connection 
between non-manual jobs and higher income 
from work, the formalization of work 
demonstrated by inclusion in social security 
systems, the seniority rosters, which open the 
way for promotions not available to manual 
workers, the less arduous everyday working 
conditions and, lastly, the social prestige which is 
still attached to this type of work. 
Without going into the details of the topic, 
it is clear that in the initial stage of this 
expansion the fact of crossing the divide 
between manual and non-manual work 
constituted in itself a form of upward mobility, 
and that subsequently, as this mobility spread, 
internal differences acquired decisive 
importance; entry into the lowest non-manual 
subcategories could not therefore be seen as a 
social advance. However, for the generation 
which had crossed the divide for the first time in 
their family history, the change was certainly 
perceived, from the symbolic standpoint, as 
upward mobility. 
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4. Uses and benefits of education 
The education data for the six countries chosen 
as representative of different categories of 
modernization show that in all the countries in 
the period 1960-1980 the percentage of the 
young EAP with post-primary education doubled, 
except in Ecuador where it tripled. 
Table 2 presents the categories with seven 
years and more of education in Argentina, Chile, 
Ecuador and Panama; five years and more for 
Brazil and four years and more for Honduras. 
The differences in the number of years of 
education used in defining the significant 
categories correspond to differences in 
educational development among the countries of 
the region. They also illustrate the difficulty of 
correlating the education indicators with the 
indicators of economic growth: in two countries 
of rapid modernization and economic growth 
(Ecuador and Brazil) the achievements are very 
différent; and Chile, despite its relative 
stagnation, has achieved education levels much 
higher than those of Brazil, despite this 
country's rapid economic growth. 
The first and well-documented use of 
education was to facilitate migration by persons 
who had completed their schooling and 
abandoned their manual agricultural activities, 
whether waged or unwaged. 
In both I960 and 1980 the proportion of 
young people with seven and more years of 
schooling occupying manual jobs in primary 
activities was a very small percentage of the 
young EAP, and its increase from one generation 
to another was tiny. The expectation that the 
coming of mechanization and technology to the 
countryside would produce a supply of new jobs 
suitable for educated young people was 
disappointed; on the other hand, the supply of 
education for longer than six school years did not 
expand in the countryside itself, except in Chile, 
so that in the other countries such jobs would 
have been available only to young people who 
studied in urban centres but continued to live in 
the countryside. 
The second use of education was to 
facilitate the incorporation of the category of 
non-manual workers. This category has very 
high growth rates and demands post-primary 
education; except in Honduras, persons without 
such education are gradually being eliminated 
from this kind of job. In Argentina, for example, 
young people with incomplete primary 
schooling holding non-manual jobs made up 
18.4% of the EAP in I960, a figure which had 
fallen to 4.6% in 1980, despite the strong 
growth in the category. 
Non-manual jobs are becoming more 
complicated, for one thing; for another, the 
supply of educated young persons exceeds the 
demand, and employers are thus able to insist on 
higher formal levels of education for the same . 
work. It should be noted in this connection that 
the spread and prolongation of schooling tended 
to reduce grade standards. Lastly, the gradual 
acquisition of wages status by non-manual 
workers establishes a formal relationship 
between the education level and the 
requirements imposed by organizations for 
certain jobs. All this explains the cycle of 
"forward retreat" in the education systems of 
Latin America. Lower social groups are required 
to obtain levels of education formerly reserved 
for the higher groups, which in turn move up to 
a still higher level. This demand process is 
similar to the one found in developed and 
centrally planned societies. However, unlike 
them, it does not differentiate clearly between 
compulsory school courses and higher courses 
based on selectivity through the regular 
assessment of knowledge and admission tests for 
non-compulsory courses. 
The third use of education was to facilitate 
the incorporation of the category of waged 
manual workers. This category receives higher 
incomes than the category of own-account 
manual workers, especially in the case of young 
people, who do not have a capital of knowledge 
and experience in the activity concerned. As in 
the case of non-manual jobs, employment in 
organizations at a certain level is accompanied 
by items of social protection (holidays, pension 
rights, health services). 
As far as the young people of Argentina 
and Chile are concerned (early-modernization 
countries), the category of waged manual 
workers is smaller in percentage terms: there is 
an increase in the share of EAP of the non-
manual category, and at the same time the 
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Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA (SIX COUNTRIES): YOUTH EDUCATION LEVELS 
A N D JOB CATEGORIES, I960 A N D 1980 
(Percentages) 
EAP 25-34 



























































































































































(9.7) (17.6) (13.3) 






























(2.8) (27.6) (10.9) (37.4) (25.4) (31.2) (10.0) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of census data. 
"The figures for Brazil are for 5 years and more and 0-4 years of education respectively. 
The figures for Honduras are for 4 years and more and 0-3 years of education respectively. 
cData from the National Household Survey of October-December 1980 (National Statistical Institute). 
Excluding the category of persons on whose status no information is available. 
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proportion of manual waged workers stabilizes 
or declines, with major reductions in youth 
employment. In the other countries, in contrast, 
the situation is varied: there is a very steep 
decline in the category of young people 
employed in agriculture, and increases in the 
categories of non-manual and manual waged 
workers in the total young EAP. However, 
common to all the countries is the increase in the 
proportion of better educated persons in the 
category of manual waged workers; in Argentina 
and Chile they are already more numerous than 
the less educated. 
The future trends of youth employment 
—assuming that the crisis is overcome— 
underline the exhaustion of the cycle of 
structural mobility. 
The category of non-manual workers, 
which has expanded rapidly, will not be able to 
continue to grow at the same rate. Within the 
category, there will be a greater polarization 
between jobs of high and low status, partly 
because of the expansion of the category and 
partly because of the increasingly technical 
nature of the tasks. This polarization will be 
linked with requirements not only for post-
primary education but for post-secondary or 
post-university as well. 
The size of the waged manual category 
indicates that there will be a bottleneck in 
structural mobility affecting the new 
generations coming from rural families and 
from families of manual urban own-account 
workers. Furthermore, the effect of technologies 
that require less labour could be very great in this 
sector, and this would produce a percentage 
reduction and an increase in selectivity based on 
education level. 
Faced with the crystallization of the 
employment structure, the reply of Latin 
American societies, sharply stratified by income 
and power, has been to seek ways of controlling 
mobility which does not yet amount to a 
structural transition. 
Some mechanisms have emerged as a 
response to the "excessive" expectations of 
upward mobility through education. One of 
them, historically, was to keep the rural 
population on the margins of education. 
Another, ancient in some countries and 
presented as "modernization" in others, is to 
transfer the costs of primary education to local 
institutions, whose resources are proportionate 
to the incomes of the local residents; the quality 
of education thus differs according to locality, 
and is lower in the poorest. Yet another 
mechanism has been to prevent the 
standardization of the quality of education in the 
basic course and to create relatively excellent 
academic routes which operate from the pre-
school to the university levels, quite separate 
from an education, usually provided by the State, 
considered to be "education of the poor". 
However, even if the education systems 
were standardized and offset the relative 
disadvantages of the pupils with fewer socio-
cultural resources, there would still have to be 
selection all the way from the basic levels, which 
would correspond to some extent to the 
technical nature and therefore to the status of 
jobs in a differentiated society, be it capitalist, 
socialist, or modelled on some kind of utopia.* 
Once the structural change has been completed, 
the aspirations and expectations will necessarily 
cease to be those of job mobility for all. 
Theoretically they could be, on the one hand, 
those of standardization of basic services and 
resources —food, health, education— which 
would provide similar training and 
opportunities for all in each new generation; 
and, on the other hand, changes in income 
distribution so that people in the lowest 
categories will have enough to meet personal 
needs, including culture, changes which would 
probably substantially reduce the incomes and 
power of the highest categories. 
Mt is significant that the studies of upward mobility and 
education deny that the latter does not provide opportunities of the 
former —taken to mean access to high-status jobs. The argument 
would assume that the top posts should expand at the same rate as 
the levels of higher education, university for example, which would 
mean an impossibility, unless, paradoxically, there was a reduction 
in the expansion of education. The argument still focuses on 
expectations of undefined structural change and assessment of the 
value of education not in terms of culture and learning but as a 
passport to posts with higher income and intellectual status, all of 
which can form part of the mesocratic illusion of social mobility. 
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III 
The manifestations of the youth crisis 
The exhaustion —or at least the "easy" stage— 
of the structural transformation coincided in the 
region with the recession resulting from 
external debt and the economic policies pursued 
to counter the recession. 
The position of young people in relation to 
the work market underwent a sharp reversal. 
Having been the main beneficiaries of the earlier 
model of expansion, they became the group most 
seriously harmed by the recession. This 
phenomenon had the following characteristics: 
a) The State cut expenditure sharply 
—especially social expenditure— halting the 
policy of expanding employment in the social 
and community services which were one of the 
foundations of the expansion of the tertiary 
sector. 
b) Productive and service enterprises were 
faced with a reduced demand and stopped taking 
on new staff. Moreover, when they began to 
expand their production in 1985 —in some 
countries or sectors— they did so with their 
existing workforce, whose distribution and 
efficiency has had to improve to cope with the 
crisis. 
c) The expansion of education which might 
have formed part of the policy to combat 
recession did not come about, owing to the 
necessary reduction of fiscal expenditure. 
However, the education system with its pre-
existing structures and with impaired efficiency 
did accept an increasing volume of young people 
who prolonged their studies because of the 
difficulty of finding work. 
As a result of this situation, young people 
under 25 account in many countries for 
approximate ly half of open urban 
unemployment, and first-time job seekers are 
coming to represent one-quarter of unemployed 
persons, as is happening for example in Uruguay 
(ECLAC, 1985a). 
In the countryside, various indicators seem 
to suggest that the opportunities of migration to 
the towns have declined and that there is an 
increase in the numbers of young people with 
decent education engaged in farming activities. 
These activities increased their production as a 
result of the crisis, but they did not undergo 
significant structural or technological changes 
which would have furnished better employment 
opportunities for the more educated young 
people who remained in the countryside. 
The information on one country, Chile, is 
illustrative of this, for the cycle of 
transformation had been completed in Chilean 
society; the efforts to modernize through 
education had been among the most intensive in 
the region, yet the unemployment figures, 
already high before the crisis, were pushed by it 
to the highest levels in the region. 
Data for 1980 and 19844 show that the 
already high proportion of students in the group 
increased still further, from 66.8 to 71.7% for 
the 15-19 age range, and from 18.7 to 19.6% for 
the next age range, aged 20 to 24 (table 3). This 
increase was in step with a percentage reduction 
in the category of active persons aged 15 to 19, 
which declined to 14.9% from an already low 
level of 18.3 %• This strengthens the mechanism 
of reducing the pressure exerted on the work 
market by a young generation which represents 
a very high proportion of the total working-age 
population. 
The status of student in 1980 (table 4) was 
already relatively accessible for the various socio-
occupational categories in the 15-19 age range 
(50.4% of children of domestic employees and 
85% of children of employers). Faced with a 
smaller jobs market, the collective demand for 
study increased: practically all the categories 
increased their participation in education (69% 
of children of domestic employees and 95% of 
children of employers in 1984). 
* The tabulations un which this section is based use data for 21 
of the country's main towns and were prepared by the consultant 
Arturo León as part of a study sponsored by the Unit for the 
Integration of Women in Development of KCLAC's Social 
Development Division. 
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Table 3 






































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the National Statistical Institute (INE), National Household Survey October-
December 1980 and 1984. 
In 1984 the continuation of studies in the 
20-24 age range was determined more by social 
origin. Two upper categories —non-agricultural 
employers and middle-range wage sectors— 
kept more than 40% of their children in that age 
group in education; another three categories 
—middle-range independent sectors, tradition-
al craftsmen, and persons active in the primary 
sector— did so for some 20% <ii their children; 
the upper level of the working-class category 
kept 13% in education. The lowest-status jobs 
—lower working-class level, marginal workers, 
seasonal workers and those employed in 
programmes of the PEM/POJH kind— kept less 
than 10% in education. The lowest figure 
(1.8%) was for domestic employees. 
In 1984 education opportunities increased 
for the employers and middle-range sectors, 
which had the common feature of receiving non-
waged incomes» and for the working-class and 
sub-working-class categories. The sharpest 
decline was in the middle-range waged sectors. 
These apparently contradictory developments 
can be understood when it is remembered that 
the lower socio-occupational categories have 
high proportions of their children in these age 
groups in free secondary education. The children 
from the higher categories have already 
completed their secondary schooling, and their 
higher education is paid for; consequently, the 
middle-range waged sectors, which suffered 
large declines in their incomes, had difficulty in 
financing the cost of education. 
In 1980 the social integration of young 
people aged 20 to 24 was already showing signs 
of exclusion, as is pointed out in the study by 
Javier Martínez in this issue of the CEPAL 
Review. The proportion of unemployed and 
first-time work seekers was 12.7%; when 
marginal employment is included —PEM and 
POJH jobs and domestic work— the total for all 
active and inactive young people was 20.5% 
(table 5). 
The situation deteriorated sharply as a 
result of the economic policies introduced to 
combat the crisis. Unemployment increased to 
18%; when marginal employment is included it 
totalled 28.2% of young people. This increase 
was due to the reduction in the number of 
employed persons (own-account workers, 
manual workers, white-collar workers and 
employers) which declined from its former 
38.1% to 29.8%, while inactive young persons 
(students or domestic helpers) held their share 
at slightly above 40%. To put it another way, in 
1980 
Table 4 
CHILE: SOCIAL ORIGIN OF S T U D E N T S , 1980 A N D 1984 
(Absolute numbers and percentages) 
Occupation 
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Table 5 
CHILE: SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF Y O U N G PEOPLE AGED 20 TO 24, 
1980 A N D 1984 
(Percentages) 
Unemployed 
First-time job seekers 
PEM/POJH 
Female domestic employees 




Businessmen, professional and 
technical staff 
Students 














































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the National Statistical Institute (1NE), National Household Survey, October-
December 1980 and 1984. 
1984 out of every 10 young persons aged 20 to 24 
two were studying and two performing 
household chores, three were employed in 
relatively formal activities and three remained 
unemployed and found only marginal access to 
the work market. 
The lower the educational level of young 
people, the higher their rate of exclusion 
(table 6). In 1984,33.7% of those with no more 
than basic schooling were unemployed or 
employed in marginal jobs; the proportion 
declined slightly for those with secondary 
education (31.8%) and fell sharply for those 
with higher education (7.8%). Between 1980 
and 1984 the exclusion of this last group 
increased by 1.7%, while the exclusion of young 
people with secondary education (who account 
for three-quarters of the age group and were the 
most seriously affected by the crisis) increased by 
9.4%. 
The members of the higher-education 
category protect themselves against the crisis by 
continuing their studies (73.2%). Those with 
primary and to a lesser extent those with 
secondary education (31.7 and 24% 
respectively) remain largely excluded from 
education and the work market, occupying 
themselves with domestic tasks which facilitate 
the social survival of the families and the 
employment of other members of the 
household. Only one-tenth of this group 
manages to continue in the education system. 
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Table 6 
CHILE: EDUCATION LEVELS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES OF YOUNG PEOPLE 
AGED 20 TO 24, 1980-1984 
Unemployed 
First-time job seekers 
PEM/POJH and public manual 
workers 
Domestic employees 
Own-account workers and 
unpaid family members 
Private manual workers 
Public and private white-collar 
workers 
Employers, professional and 
technical staff 
Students 





















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the National Statistical Institute (INE), National Household Survey, October-
December 1980 and 1984. 
One of the most remarkable aspects of the 
non-marginal employment of the education 
categories is the reduced access to manual work 
of young people with primary education (from 
two to one in 10) and the reduced access of those 
with secondary education to white-collar and 
manual jobs. In 1984 it is practically impossible 
for young people with only primary education to 
become manual workers; with such limited 
recruitment and such an ample labour supply, it 
is necessary to have something more than basic 
education to become a manual worker. 
The last aspect of this picture is obtained by 
studying the social integration of young people 
according to the socio-occupational categories of 
the heads of family (table 7), i.e., studying 
upward and downward mobility in the new 
generations faced with an employment structure 
which rejects them. 
Analysis of the occupations of the heads of 
the families of excluded young people (table 8) 
shows the systematic correlation between 
exclusion and social origin. In the lower part of 
the scale, unemployed heads of family or those 
working in emergency work programmes 
(PEM/POJH) have almost half of their children 
socially excluded and only 12.5 % in education; in 
the upper part, the employers have exactly the 
inverse distribution. In the middle ranges, 
exclusion declines and continued education 
increases, in accordance with a very clear pattern 
of social stratification: the categories of marginal 
workers and poorest manual workers have a 
third of their children excluded, and the 
Table 7 
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PEM/POJH 
Domestic employees 
Own-account workers and 
unpaid family members 
Manual workers 
Businessmen, technical staff, 
public and private white-
collar workers 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures-from the National Statistical Institute (INE), National Household Survey, October-December 1984. 
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categories of higher-status manual workers and 
craf tsmen a quar te r ; the middle-range 
i ndependen t sectors —under l in ing the 
polarization within the category— also have a 
quarter excluded, but at the same time they keep 
almost a third of their young people in 
education. Lastly, the middle-range waged 
sectors keep their children in the education 
system in order to save them from exclusion, 
train them for a very competitive work market 
and delay the moment of confrontation with the 
realities of employment. 
Two clear facts emerge concerning 
exclusion and they are also related to social 
stratification. The first is that the higher the 
position of the heads of family in the status scale, 
the lower the proportion of their children in 
marginal occupation. The second is that the 
majority of those in such occupations come from 
families of the unemployed and first-time job 
seekers. 
The social effects of the economic policies 
introduced to combat the crisis, in conjunction 
with the exhaustion of the cycle of structural 
change and the tendency for a status hierarchy to 
be re-established in the relations between social 
groups, show a continuation of social 
stratification and an accentuation of its 
polarization. If it is remembered that the three 
lowest categories of heads of family represent 
more than a third of the total, it can be 
understood that a large proportion of the new 
generations will form part, not of a low social 
stratum, but of a separate stratum of society. At 
the other end of the scale, the categories of heads 
of family whose children remain relatively 
protected against the crisis represent little more 
than a fifth of the total. Exclusion also affects 
seriously the middle-range categories of manual 
and independent workers, and it is therefore 
difficult to avoid the feeling that the crisis affects 
youth as such. However, and as has been shown, 
the crisis arrives at the culmination of a process 
of recomposition of social stratification and 
polarity. 
Of course, this is not the situation 
throughout the region, with respect either to the 
level of unemployment or to the intensity with 
which the effects of the crisis are concentrated in 
the lower group. In situations of full 
participation these latter groups receive a 
Table 8 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the National Statistical Institute (INE), National Household Survey, October-
December 1984. 
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relatively more equitable share of expenditure. 
However, it must be assumed that in the various 
countries social position has become more 
decisive with respect to the destiny of each 
Just as the process of economic growth in earlier 
decades was dominated by expansion of the 
productive and urban consumer markets, the 
decisive element in the social processes affecting 
youth was incorporation in the modern 
employment system, and in urban education and 
culture. In both cases the crucial factor was the 
growth rate: economically, this did not produce 
any great changes in income distribution, while 
socially there were changes in the distribution of 
cultural capital. This imbalance was possible 
within the framework of change in the 
structures of production, employment and 
satisfaction of social needs fed by urbanization 
and modernization and by the need to legitimize 
power systems affected by the permanent 
integration of new sectors in the social system. 
The economic and social processes were 
conditioned by the structural transformation 
which began in the region in the immediate 
post-war period. This transformation created 
mobile societies, in which young people were the 
particular beneficiaries both of changes in the 
production structure —with new jobs available 
only to the better educated— and of the 
deliberate and spontaneous processes of social 
modernization and national integration. 
This change was not governed by 
considerations of equality of opportunity or the 
creation of social homogeneity; those objectives, 
when they did guide social policy, came into 
conflict with the former power structures and 
the type of economic development based more 
on growth than distribution. However, the 
majority of the youth group did receive some 
satisfaction, for all of them, in some way or 
category of young people; this leads to the 
conclusion that in the present context it may be 
more accurate to speak of different classes of 
youth rather than of a generational unit. 
another, shifted their positions in the social 
universe. 
Up to the 1980s, in contrast, societies were 
already crystallized in some countries; in others, 
the "easy" transformation had run its course, and 
in still others the structural change had been 
very weak, owing to economic and social 
constraints. 
The possibilities of future development 
became linked, economically, to the capacity to 
expand markets through changes in income 
distribution in accordance with the model of the 
developed countries, and socially, to the 
formation of new generations with basically 
standardized levels of physical, health and 
educational development capable of meeting the 
complex technical and cultural requirements of 
the new forms of production and society which 
already characterized the developed countries. 
It was at this stage that the region's 
economic crisis occurred, slowing the process of 
structural change and crystallizing the social 
stratification emerging from a transformation 
not governed by considerations of equity. 
The young generations suffer the effects of 
the crisis not only in the shortage of jobs and the 
deterioration of social services: as the recession 
imposes itself on the dynamics of the situation, it 
is no longer defined by age group but by social 
origin, which in turn is heavily polarized by the 
concentration of income and power in the 
previous period. 
The democratic political systems which 
consolidated themselves or emerged as a means 
of responding to this concentration must 
grapple with the problem of how to change the 
IV 
Some final thoughts 
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distribution and lay the foundations for the 
social rights of citizenship against a background 
of crisis. One of the main challenges, no doubt, is 
how to initiate a new style of development, 
beginning with youth policies and capable of 
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